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Who Scripts European Trade Policies? 








1. Introduction  
 
The envisioned Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and 
the EU figures prominently in the competitive regionalism strategies that mark the relationship 
between the United States (US) and the European Union (EU). Following the conclusion of the 
North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the EU has negotiated a free trade agreement 
(FTA) with Mexico in 1999 (Dür, 2007) and now seeks to establish another foothold in the North 
American market with a partnership agreement with Canada. The EU‟s recent turn to bilateral 
and regional trade negotiations marks an important break with the multilateral commitment and 2 
 
its interest in the World Trade Organization‟s (WTO) Doha Round, championed by former EU 
Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy.  
 
The current CETA talks thus have to be studied in the context of EU trade policy-making in 
general. Who is behind the political decision to engage in bilateral trade talks? What explains the 
move from multilateralism to FTAs such as the EU-Canada agreement? In all industrialized 
countries, domestic support for such initiatives is tepid in part because the public perceives that 
these agreements benefit big business rather than workers or the general public. In the EU, the 
multi-level nature of trade policy further complicates the definition of common objectives: are 
the member states the drivers of EU trade policy or do the supranational institutions, and in 
particular the European Commission, determine the goals and the scope of external negotiations? 
Understanding the CETA negotiations between Canada and the EU necessitates untangling who 
scripts European trade policy.  
 
Presenting the literature on trade policy-making in the EU, this chapter spells out the tensions 
between supranationalists, which underline the role of the Commission, and 
intergovermentalists, who insist on the high degree of control of the member states. In particular, 
I show where they disagree about the autonomy of the supranational authorities, the effective 
control of member states over the Commission and the influence of interest groups. By nuancing 
the nature of the relationship between supranational authorities and interest groups, I then argue 
that an exclusive focus on either one of the three main actors in EU trade policy is misleading. 
Member states‟ preferences are crucial and the Commission does listen to interest group 
concerns, but interest groups also adapt to political constraints. They can therefore become 3 
 
welcome allies in the negotiation between the Commission and the member states. Put 
differently, the discussion highlights the relationship between the Commission and economic 
interest groups to point out a missing link in the argument of intergovernmentalists. The 
Commission can shape the pressures firms exert at the domestic level. The role of the 
Commission is thus all the more important because it shapes the relationship of the other actors, 
which are necessarily part of the picture. 
 
The chapter divides into three parts. It begins with an overview of the legal framework and EU 
trade policy literatures arguments on who governs trade policy in the EU and then develops an 
argument about the dynamics in business-government relations in EU trade policy. The third part 
turns to the recent policy initiatives and illustrates the theoretical argument in order to draw 
insights for the current EU-Canada negotiations. 
 
2. Who governs EU trade policy? 
 
Fundamentally, analysts from both the general public and the scientific community divide into 
two camps: a first strand argues that trade policy is tailored to serve the interest of firms, a 
second points to the institutional set-up and argues that decision-makers are sufficiently 
autonomous from societal pressures and can make policy choices based on a mix of motives. The 
first line of argument relies on a political economy framework, where governments respond to 
business demands. Scholars in the second group point to the delegation mechanisms and argue 
that public actors and the Commission in particular maintain an important degree of autonomy. It 4 
 
is helpful to look at the three main actors of EU trade policy – the Commission, the member 
states, and interest groups – in order to understand the dividing lines between these two champs.   
 
The degree of autonomy of the European Commission 
Trade policy is one of the most integrated policy areas in the EU. In fact, the common 
commercial policy is as old as the European Economic Community itself. With the Treaty of 
Rome in 1957, member states agreed that a customs union requires a common external tariff, 
common trade agreements with third countries and uniform application across member states 
(Elsig, 2002; Meunier, 2005). They granted the European institutions the right to speak on their 
behalf on these issues in external trade negotiations.
1 Initially, this authority applied to tariff 
rates, anti-dumping and subsidies, which were indeed the main stakes in early multilateral trade 
negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). During the Tokyo 
Round of GATT (1973-9) and especially during the Uruguay Round (1986-94), non-tariff 
barriers to trade started to gain importance, including health, environmental and social aspects of 
trade policy, and the domestic regulatory issues applying to the trade in services. European trade 
authority did not apply to many of these issues, which pushed the Community to redefine trade 
competences and the degree of delegation from the member states to the EU. In particular, it 
stirred up a debate over which issues should fall under “exclusive” or “mixed” competence 
(Meunier and Nicolaïdis, 1999; Meunier, 2000).
2 It was not until 2003 that the Treaty of Nice 
finally amended Article 133 and provided for the exclusive competence over services and 
intellectual property rights, with the exception of cultural and audio-visual services. 
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To clarify the division of competences, it is necessary to distinguish between the phases of the 
policy cycle (Woolcock, 2010): (1) the setting of objectives, (2) the conduct of negotiations and 
(3) the adoption of results. The negotiation objectives are decided by the General Affairs Council 
of foreign ministers on the basis of a Commission proposal. The conduct of negotiations is the 
responsibility of the Commission, in close consultation with the member states. Results are 
adopted by the General Affairs Council either by qualified majority voting under exclusive 
competence or by unanimous decision under mixed competence. In practice, however, consensus 
decisions are the norm. 
 
The European Commission is thus responsible for setting the agenda and conducting the 
negotiations. This extensive delegation of powers from the member states to the supranational 
authority is said to be driven by the desire to “speak with one voice” in international trade 
negotiations, but also in order to insulate the process from protectionist pressures (Meunier, 
2005). Interest groups concerned about trade negotiations, so the argument, will find less of an 
open ear with the European Commission, which unlike member state governments does not 
depend upon special interest support for re-election. Moreover, the European Commission faces 
its external negotiation partners and has to be accountable to a myriad of stakeholder – the 
member states, of course, but also the European Parliament, the European Court of Justice, 
economic interest groups and social NGOs. Using this complexity, it can assume leadership and 
increase its room for maneuver by referring to tensions between the different demands (van den 
Hoven, 2004).  
 6 
 
According to those focusing on the role of the Commission, delegation from the member states 
to the supranational institutions thus created “autonomy by design” (Elsig, 2007: 932). Within 
this strand, there are several hypothesis about the ends to which the Commission will use its 
autonomy. For some, the insulation from protectionist pressures was a means to cement the 
policy objective of trade liberalization (Meunier, 2005: 7-8). Still, others doubt that external 
trade liberalization was an intentional process, arguing instead that it is a necessary consequence 
of the institutional set-up (Hanson, 1998). Young (2004) in turn points out that the EU is not 
necessarily liberal, but the Commission pursues solutions that fit the goals of the member states 
collectively: be they more liberal or regulatory constraints that apply to the entire EU and shield 
it from the outside. In some cases, the EU simply tries to export its own organizational model 
and extend it through trade negotiations (Young, 2002). Finally, in an attempt to analyze the EU 
as a unitary actor in world politics, realist approaches have pointed out the Commission can also 
pursue geo-political strategies such as balancing against the US or containing China (Aggarwal 
and Fogarty, 2004; Zimmermann, 2007). Which one of these objectives will most likely 
determine EU trade policy choices appears to depend on the context of international pressures 
and external challenges. Nonetheless, all authors within this literature strand concur that the role 
of the supranational institutions in EU trade policy goes beyond pure intergovernmental 
decision-making. 
 
Control exerted by the Member States 
And yet, a cursory look at the extensive delegation tends to ignore the multiple control 
mechanisms that member states have put in place to oversee the actions of the Commission (De 
Bièvre and Dür, 2005). Long before the formal adoption of a mandate, the Commission submits 7 
 
the proposal to the member states or, more precisely, to the national trade officials representing 
their governments in the Article 133 Committee (see Johnson, 1998). Discussions during this 
phase are crucial, since the Commission can use the Article 133 Committee “as a sounding board 
to ensure that it is on the right track” (Shaffer, 2003: 79). Trying to achieve a consensus on the 
mandate, the Article 133 Committee examines and amends the proposal before handing it to the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and eventually the Council. Even in areas 
of exclusive competence, consultation with the member states is essential. The Article 133 
Committee closely follows negotiations and the EU negotiation team meets daily with member 
state representatives.  
 
The importance of consensus between the member states applies equally to dispute settlement 
procedures. The most common way to bring a dispute to the WTO is for the Commission to 
initiate a case after consultation with the Article 133 Committee. Formal procedure requires 
conflictual issues to be transferred to COREPER and subsequently to the Council, should all 
other instances fail to resolve the dispute. In all the time the WTO has employed the dispute 
settlement procedure, this has only happened once.
3 According to Shaffer (2003: 80) “neither 
committee members nor the Commission wish to transfer decision-making authority on trade 
matters from themselves, who are trade experts, to the Council, which consists of foreign affairs 
ministers.” In other words, the Commission cannot become active or negotiate effectively if the 
EU member states are not behind the Community objectives. 
 
Delegation is thus accompanied by a long list of formal and informal control mechanisms, as 
principal-agent analysis suggests and many analysts have confirmed in the context of EU trade 8 
 
policy (Kerremans, 2004; De Bièvre and Dür, 2005; Dür and Elsig, 2011). With reference to 
these control mechanisms, several authors argue therefore that it is the interests of the member 
states that determine trade policy. Again, the observed content of policy preferences varies 
between studies, which point out that member states may be motivated by geo-political 
considerations or by economic interests. Aggarwal and Fogarty (2004: 10-11) cite foreign policy 
motives and strategic interests behind the construction of interregional regimes. Similarly Sapir 
(1998: 727) highlights that member states‟ desire to move beyond ties with former colonies helps 
to explain the turn towards an increasing number of FTAs. He also points to the economic stakes 
defended by member states.  
 
Dür (2008) makes the economic argument most forcefully in a critique of what he labels as the 
“collusive delegation argument”. In an extensive study of EU trade policy from 1930 to the 
present, he traces EU policy objectives back to the interest of exporters, who successfully 
lobbied their national governments and thereby shaped external policy (Dür, 2010). Every time 
exporters were excluded from a regional agreement between other countries, they pressed their 
governments to have their own regional agreement or regain market access through further 
liberalization. Common EU trade policy can thus be understood as a member state strategy 
aimed at protecting exporters and we should expect it to vary as a function of their foreign 
market access and the sectors that are concerned by discriminatory agreements elsewhere.  
 
Finally, Ehrlich (2009) demonstrates the importance of member state control and economic 
interests by challenging the notion of a common external tariff. He shows that despite common 
tariff schedules, member states are actually subject to quite different conditions depending on the 9 
 
bundle of goods that they import. Some import more high-tariff goods than others. The resulting 
difference in the actual trade-weighted tariffs of each member states is intentional, he argues, and 
results from the pressures of the affected industries in each country. For Ehrlich and Dür, the 
economic interests of domestic firms are thus key to understanding member states behavior on 
trade policy. Protection for import-competing firms is achieved through differential tariffs and 
protection for exporters through targeted trade agreements with key markets.  
 
Interest groups influence 
This brings us to the third potential driver of EU trade policy: interests groups, which can be both 
economic actors and non-governmental organizations interested in trade-related issues such as 
labor standards, the environment or economic development. The previous discussion has 
highlighted that interest groups can become active at the national level and pressure member 
state governments to defend their interests on external trade vis-à-vis other member states. 
Relying on an extensive literature in the political economy of trade, the causal argument 
employed by these authors postulates that government official seek to increase campaign 
financing and/or their chances of getting re-elected and are therefore attentive to interest groups 
with strong preferences on trade policy (see Alt et al., 1996; Grossman and Helpman, 2001; 
Hiscox, 2002). Understanding which interest groups will shape EU trade policy therefore 
requires studying the importance of different industries in each of the member states and the 
access point business lobbyists have at their disposal in the respective domestic institutions 
(Ehrlich, 2007; Dür, 2010). Because of collective action problems inherent to social movements 
and public interest groups, the main focus in this domestic lobbying literature has been on 
economic actors. 10 
 
 
Alternatively, interest groups can become active at the supranational level and try to enter the EU 
trade policy-making process at various stages. Even though discussions between the Commission 
and the Article 133 Committee on negotiation objectives are not public, the Commission consults 
extensively with firms, interest groups and NGOs in order to define specific stakes in its 
proposal. The EU consultation procedure is less formal than the system of Trade Advisory 
Committees in the US, but the Commission DG Trade and DG Industry maintain stable relations 
with groups such as the Union of Industries of the European Community (UNICE) or sectoral 
business associations. In 1998, the Commission tried to formalize its consultation and include a 
broader range of interest groups by instituting a Civil Society Dialogue on the upcoming round 
of negotiations (Van den Hoven, 2002; De Bièvre and Dür, 2007). The European Parliament may 
play a greater role in the future, especially now that co-decision has been extended by the Treaty 
of Amsterdam, but lobbying on trade policy still concentrates on the interchange between the 
Commission and member governments.  
 
The Commission is also the main lobbying target for administrative procedures to ensure 
protection against „unfair‟ foreign competition. These instruments of commercial defence 
include anti-dumping and countervailing duties and the Trade Barriers Regulation of 1994. In 
February 1996, the Commission launched a new Market Access Strategy. Within DG Trade, a 
Market Access Unit was established, the primary role of which was to interact with business 
actors to gather information on existing trade barriers. A central pillar of the work was the 
maintenance of a Market Access Database (see De Bièvre, 2002: 96-100).
4 By centralizing 11 
 
information on trade barriers and involving firms in the collection of information, the EU was 
hoping to be able to counter the aggressive private–public partnerships of US trade policy.  
 
Interest groups are thus present at both the domestic level and the supranational level, and the 
Commission even actively seeks to involve them. However, very few observers contend that the 
mere presence of private interests is sufficient to explain the evolution of trade policy, with the 
exception of advocacy groups warning against the increase of lobbying in Brussels (Balanyà et 
al., 1999). In the scientific literature, the role of interest groups depends on the ways in which 
they contribute to shaping the economic preferences of member states or the policy-objectives of 
the Commission, which reflects the two champs on the governance of EU trade policy cited in 
the beginning. Intergovernmentalists evaluate the importance of interest groups with a political 
economy perspective where domestic politics shapes member state preferences. Supranationalists 
concentrate on the coalitions between European institutions and lobbyists active in Brussels.    
 
3. The two channel logic of lobbying on EU trade policy 
 
It is difficult to determine whether intergovernmentalists or supranationalists provide a more 
accurate picture of EU trade policy, because many cases are marked by “observational 
equivalence” (Damro, 2007). This methodological problem arises in principal-agent analysis 
when the absence of conflict can be interpreted as either complete autonomy of the European 
Commission or perfect control by the member states. Moreover, the fact that businesses voice 
demands which are actually reflected in policy choices says little about the direction of causality. 
Did these interest groups persuade policy-makers to act on their behalf or do we only notice 12 
 
those groups that are supportive of the final outcome, which others have been ignored or chosen 
to remain silent after they lost their political battle? Taken together these two problems highlight 
the weakness of political-economy approaches, which tend to overestimate the weight of interest 
groups in EU trade negotiations.  
 
I argue that the main difficulty with interest-group focused accounts is the assumed uni-
directionality of influence going from interest groups to policy-makers. Once we consider how 
interest groups adapt their demands to the constraint of policy-makers, it become possible to see 
that both the Commission and member states shape trade policy choices. However, the role of 
the Commission is crucial, because it can strategically use interest groups to affect the policy 
stances of member states. To see this missing link in the dynamics of EU trade policy-making, it 
is important to consider (1) how the Commission relies on interest groups and actively solicits 
their help through “reverse lobbying” and (2) how interest groups adapt to these opportunities by 
choosing their policy venue according to the demands they would like to voice. Let us consider 
each of these in turn. 
 
Reverse lobbying 
It is beyond question that business interests are well represented in Brussels and that they interact 
frequently with EU policy-makers on trade-related concerns (Coen, 1997; Coen, 1999; Cowles, 
2001). In fact, EU officials openly admit that trade policy is made to benefit business and aims to 
support the competitive position of European firms in the world economy (Interview, Council 
Secretariat, 21 October 2002). In order to do so effectively, consultation with business 
representatives is essential. Over the course of trade talks, in particular during the Uruguay 13 
 
Round, the Commission had to face US negotiators with very strong business support behind 
them, and openly complained about the absence of European firms (Grant, 1994: 83-5; Van den 
Hoven, 2002: 10). Integrating business interests into the formulation of trade objectives therefore 
became an important goal for the European Commission in the 1990s, because it actually 
strengthens their negotiating position. One of the most noted initiatives was the Transatlantic 
Business Dialogue (TABD), founded in 1995, which aims to bring together CEOs of American 
and European companies so that they could “pre-negotiate” issues relevant to transatlantic trade 
(Coen and Grant, 2000; Cowles, 2001). Similarly, the Commission encouraged the creation of 
other consultative associations, such as the European Service Forum, launched in January 1999. 
These business fora, together with the Civil Society Dialogue illustrate that the Commission 
actively solicits participation from private actors and is willing to listen to their suggestions.  
 
On the one hand, private actors can supply expertise and information about their competitive 
position, which help to bolster the EU‟s negotiating stance vis-à-vis the outside. On the other 
hand, business support helps the Commission to gain information about potential lines of conflict 
between the member states and to increase the urgency of its proposals. Both externally and 
internally, business support and interest group activity more generally is thus an important 
resource for the Commission. Shaffer (2003) has noted the extensive and sometimes 
unsuccessful attempts of the European Commission to solicit business interests. Compared to 
business-government relations in the US, where business representative aggressively lobby the 
government, he underlines the “reverse lobbying” in the EU, where the public authority lobbies 
business to lobby itself. This explains why business-government relations are tight during trade 14 
 
negotiations, but it also indicates that we should not necessarily equate this closeness with 
governmental capture (Elsig, 2002; Hocking and McGuire, 2002; Woll, 2008).  
 
Two-channel logic 
In particular, we need to understand how much leeway the Commission has when dealing with 
business demands and it turns out that this room for manoeuver is significant. Since Commission 
officials do not depend on re-election by constituency interests, firms cannot exert direct pressure 
on European officials to reinforce their demands. Therefore, business access is not automatic; it 
depends on the degree to which private actors can offer the elements the Commission is 
interested in. Business lobbying on trade is thus marked by a particular exchange logic, where 
firms provide expertise and support in order to gain access to the policy process (Bouwen, 2002; 
Mahoney, 2004). Business representatives frequently confirm that they need to carefully plan 
how to lobby “to make sure [they] will not be ignored by the Commission” (cited in Elsig, 2007: 
940). Not the intensity of lobbying activities, but the way in which it corresponds to Commission 
objectives is key to success. 
 
The selective access at the European level creates a two-channel logic for business lobbyists, 
which specifies different routes according to the content that firms seek to defend. Export-
oriented industries lobby the Commission to press for further liberalization and market access, 
while import competing industries concentrate on instruments of commercial defense and work 
with their national governments. Put differently, classical protectionism is easier to achieve in 
interaction with national governments, while cooperation on the elaboration of pan-European 
solutions promises an excellent working relationship with the European Commission.  15 
 
 
Pan-European trade policy lobbying can be in support of liberalization, but it can also consist of 
regulatory protectionism that does not discriminate on the grounds of nationality but appeals 
instead to a greater Community interest. This means that supranational trade policy initiatives are 
not always aimed at reducing trade barriers. In fact, the Commission does not have an a priori 
tendency to liberalize; it merely seeks to develop policy solutions that do not create cleavages 
between member states in order to avoid deadlock. Liberalization happens to be a pan-European 
solution, but pan-European regulation is also possible. Many have noted that the liberalization 
objectives of the EU often appear like an exercise in international regulation rather than the 
complete abandonment of all trade barriers (Winters, 2001; Cremona, 2001; Young, 2002). In 
other words, even though we should expect protectionist lobbying to employ national routes and 
businesses supporting liberalization to develop partnerships with the European Commission, we 
might also find lobbyists defending new kinds of regulatory protectionism that applies equally 
across member states. This is all the more likely when different directorate-generals of the 
European Commission have to cooperate on the content of EU trade policy. DG Agriculture or 




Several authors have shown how business lobbying has changed over time to take into account 
the institutional environment of EU trade policy. In particular, firms that lobby at the 
supranational level have moved from protectionism to non-tariff barriers to preferences for 
multilateralism in order to lock in national regulatory models  (McGuire, 1999; Crystal, 2003; 
Woll, 2008). Concerning bilateral or regional trade agreements, exporters who can benefit from 16 
 
market access have formed coalitions with the Commission and their national governments to 
support negotiations.  
 
In sum, business lobbying is an important element of EU trade policy-making, and we should 
expect to see firms and their associations engaging actively to support trade talks. However, their 
activities are facilitated by the opportunities created by the European Commission. The reverse 
lobbying undertaken by the supranational authority encourages exporters to speak up in favor of 
further market access or import-competing firms in support of EU-wide regulatory solutions. 
Classic protectionists who simply seek to defend the status quo and are opposed to new 
agreements should only become active at the national level. This two channel logic is the result 
of a trade-off interest groups face when lobbying the European Commission: if they adapt their 
demands to the Commissions objective, they will find an open ear; if they press more narrowly 
for their own interests, they risk being ignored.  
 
4. The EU-Canada Agreement as a case study in competitive regionalism 
 
The EU-Canada talks illustrate these complex dynamics and provide an opportunity to study the 
contribution of the Commission, the member states and interest groups to the evolution of the 
CETA negotiations. In line with the argument developed above, I will show that the agreement is 
part of a broader strategy of competitive regionalism pursued by the Commission with respect to 
the US. I will then evaluate the activities of interest groups, and the ways in which their demands 
have been defended by the member states, to show the relative autonomy of the Commission in 
initiating and leading the talks.  17 
 
 
Competitive regionalism between the US and the EU 
Over the last decades, and in reaction to one another, both the US and the EU have sought to 
expand their commercial influence by negotiating privileged economic partnerships with 
individual countries or regional groups (Woolcock et al., 2007; Heydon and Woolcock, 2009; 
Schott, 2009; Sbragia, 2010). The North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement between the US, Canada 
and Mexico is certainly one of the most important ones. According to most observers, NAFTA 
was a reaction to the integration of the Single European Market and the difficult multilateral 
negotiations during the Uruguay Round (Sbragia, 2010; Dür, 2010).  In response to NAFTA, the 
EU signed bilateral agreements with Chile in 1997, Mexico in 1999, South Africa in 1999 and 
pursued talks with MERCOSUR, which comprises Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay 
(see for example Dür, 2007).  
 
Beginning in 1997, the EU stopped initiating new FTAs as trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy 
was deeply committed to multilateralism and the upcoming Doha Round of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). Yet multilateral talks were painstakingly slow and the US succeeded in 
signing a relatively large number of FTAs between 2003 and 2007. Under the leadership of a 
new trade Commissioner, Peter Mandelson, the EU therefore lifted its self-imposed ban on 
bilateral talks (see European Commission, 2006; Woolcock, 2009). It began negotiating with six 
Central American states grouped as the Andean Community in 2006 and turned to Asia in 2007 
via talks with India, South Korea and ten Southeast Asian States in the ASEAN group. The EU 
and the US interest in bilateral and regional trade agreements is part of a general trend. As 
Heydon and Woolcock (2009:9) point out, there is a clear rise of preferential trade agreements in 18 
 
the world: while the average number of preferential trade agreements hovered around 3 during 
the decades of the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), it has jumped to an annual 
average of about 20 since the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2005, with a 
total number of 400 agreements in 2010. 
 
For the EU, FTAs fall into three broad categories According to (Woolcock, 2009: 4). First, some 
aim to secure the immediate neighborhood trading conditions and provide access to the European 
market, in the case of Central and Eastern Europe and the EU‟s EuroMed partners. Second, long 
standing ties with the African, Caribbean and Pacific states have arisen from colonial legacies 
and developed into commercial agreements. Third, the EU has sought to negotiate with emerging 
markets. However, the choice and timing of FTA talks was oftentimes linked to initiatives 
undertaken by other countries, and above all the US. 
 19 
 
Table 1: Bilateral and regional trade agreements 
  US  EU 
Israel  FTA since 1985  CA since 1975; AA since 2000  
Mercosur  Unsuccessful negotiations for a 
Free Trade Area of the Americas 
since 1994 
FCA since 1992; AA negotiations 
since 2000 
Mexico  FTA since 1994 (NAFTA)  FTA since 2000 
North Africa  FTA with Morroco since 2006  Euromed EPA since 1995 
Caribbean Region  FTA with Central America and 
Dominican Republic since 2005 
FTA with African, Caribbean and 
Pacific Group of States since 2000; 
EPA since 2007 
Chile  FTA signed in 2003  AA since 2003 
ASEAN-10  EAI; TIFA since 2006; FTA with 
Singapore since 2004; FTA talks 
with Thailand and Malaysia 
FTA negotiations since 2007 
Andean 
Community 
FTA with Columbia since 2006; 
FTA with Peru since 2007 
AA since 2007 
Korea  FTA since 2007  EPA negotiations since May 2007 
India  Bilateral investment treaty only  TIA negotiations since 2007 
Source: Based on Schott (2009) 
Note:  AA = Association Agreement; CA = Cooperation Agreement; EPA = Economic 
Partnership Agreement; FCA = Framework Cooperation Agreement; FTA = Free Trade 
Agreement; TIA = Trade and Investment Agreement; TIFA = Trade and Investment 
Framework Agreement. 
 
A quick look at the most important of the commercial agreements negotiated by the US and the 
EU show the interconnected timelines (table 1) and many authors have insisted on the 
phenomenon of competition regionalism (e.g. Bergsten, 1996). The negotiation of a partnership 
agreement between the EU and Canada clearly does not fall into one of the three categories of 
the EU‟s most typical preferential trade agreements. It therefore has to be understood as part of a 
competitive liberalization strategy that oppose the US and the EU. After the FTA between 
Mexico and the EU in 1999, it is another attempt by the EU to maintain a foothold in the North 
American market integrated through NAFTA. The initiative therefore embodies the inherent 
contradiction in EU trade policy objectives: favoring multilateralism, especially vis-à-vis main 20 
 
trading partners, while simultaneously pursuing bilateral negotiations to defend its commercial 
interests. 
 
Focusing on the Canadian market 
Negotiating privileged access to the Canadian market had been an objective for the EU since the 
mid-2000. Initial negotiations on a Canada-EU trade and investment agreement were shelved in 
2006, however, as talks stalled over internal trade barriers and provincial regulation. The fact 
that negotiations were taken back up less than three years later in May 2009, is due to the 
successful political campaign of the Canadian provinces, especially Quebec, which relied on 
business representatives to strengthen their case. On the European side, the Commission and the 
member states were responsive to the arguments in favor of an agreement, but business lobbying 
can only explain half of their strategic interests. 
 
To be sure, many companies were supportive of an EU-Canada agreement. The EU is Canada‟s 
second trading partner, and Canada the EU‟s 11
th largest trading partner in trade and services. 
Gains from further liberalization are projected to boost bilateral trade by around 20% (European 
Commission and Government of Canada, 2009). Exporters and large companies interested in 
investing into each others‟ markets were naturally supportive of facilitated access, and deeply 
regretted the failure of the initial talks in the mid-2000s. But it took a meeting with Quebec‟s 
Prime Minister Jean Charest, who was eager to engage in trade talks with the EU and in 
particular France, to get the ball rolling. Charest felt that a trade agreement could boost Quebec‟s 
labor market and help its exporting industry, but he was also eager to claim a more central role 
for the Canadian provinces in trade negotiations. Since earlier talks between the EU and Canada 21 
 
had failed due to their local regulations and resistance, he was able to convince Canadian Prime 
Minister Stephen Harper to make renewed trade talks a priority if he was able to gather the 
support of the Canadian provinces (Nadeau, 2009). From an initial working alliance with 
Manitoba Prime Minister Gary Doer and Ontario‟s Dalton McGuinty, Charest expanded to circle 
of support by carefully relying on business representatives to underline the economic stakes in an 
agreement. British Columbia, for example, sought opportunities for its forestry and food 
products, Alberta for cattle and the Atlantic provinces for fish. But the provinces also pushed to 
have a place at the negotiating table and found an ally in the European Commission, which 
treated them as the natural equivalence to the European member states, whose representatives sit 
alongside the Commission negotiators.   
 
The fact that the initiative came from the Canadian provinces created a welcome symmetry in the 
two federal-like systems. When Jean Charest first approached Peter Mandelson, the EU trade 
commissioner, at the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2007, he was able to convincingly 
argue that the provincial level was more appropriate than the federal level to address thorny 
issues such as public procurement contracts. Frustrated by the stalled multilateral negotiations at 
Doha, Mandelson was interested in a bilateral deal with Canada, especially an ambitious one. As 
Charest underlines, “the EU dreamed of having such an agreement with the US, which is a 
complicated country. Why not try to establish a precedent with Canada?” (Nadeau, 2009: 3). For 
the Commission, the interest was evident, but it hinged crucially on member state support. Here 
again, the role of business representatives was fundamental. During a series of visits with 
French, German, British, Italian and Polish ministers, Jean Charest tried to clarify the advantages 
of a trade deal, citing mutual investment opportunities and trade facilitation. He even met with 22 
 
Nicolas Sarkozy, a convinced Atlanticist, who was at the time Minister of the Interior. After his 
election to the French presidency in May 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy continued defending the project 
and several observers cite his role as pivotal, not only because France held the presidency of the 
European Union in the second half of 2008. One observers remarks that “Europe‟s enthusiasm, it 
seems, is largely a product of Mr. Sarkozy, who has a long relationship with the Montreal 
financier Paul G. Desmarais Sr. [whose corporation] controls investments in several prominent 
European companies, including Total and GDF Suez” (Austen, 2008). But other member states 
were equally convinced of project, especially in reducing internal barriers, as diplomats from 
Denmark, Poland, Latvia and Slovenia underlined in a joint meeting (McMullen, 2009). 
 
Throughout the initial preparation and the five negotiation rounds that followed the launch at the 
EU-Canada Summit in Prague on 6 May 2009, business lobbyists were present and supported the 
talks actively. Following initially meetings with Jean Charest and Christos Sirros, Quebec‟s 
representative in Brussels, the Canada-Europe Roundtable of CEOs from the largest corporations 
in both countries issued a declaration in October 2008 to push for negotiations.
6 Canadian 
business representatives, in particular the Canadian Council of Chief Executives gave relentless 
support and pushed for a joint declaration of several Canadian business associations to joint 
Canada EU study on trade benefits on 5 March 2009.
7 During several occasions, the main 
business associations in Canada and the EU appeared jointly: the public support for the launch of 
talks on 6 May 2009, for example, is signed by the Canada-Europe Roundtable, the Canadian 
Council of Chief Executives and BusinessEurope.
8 And yet, the lobbying activities on the 




The same is true of NGO activies and interest groups resisting the trade talks. A number of 
Canadian public interest or citizen groups have voiced concerns about the extent of 
liberalization, its effect on utilities and intellectual property rights.
10 The Trade Justice Network, 
a grouping of Canadian NGOs such as the Council of Canadians, ATTAC-Quebec or the 
National Union of Public and General Employees even travelled to Brussels to discuss concerns 
with European policy-makers and published a joint statement with 24 NGOs during 3
rd round of 
talks.
11 But not only the anti-globalization movement, nationalists or labor groups are opposed to 
the talks in Canada, there is also resistance from economic sectors such as the dairy industry, 
which benefits from provincial supply management which they would like to preserve (O‟Neil, 
2010).  On the European side, similar concerns exist, but they are much less vocal in defending 
their positions. Some opposition is also channeled through the party groups in the European 
Parliament, where the socialist left party group GUE/NGL refused to sign a joint declaration 
endorsing the talks (Agence Europe, 2010).  
 
In sum, although business interests are present during the negotiations, the interaction between 
the Commission and the member states and the dynamics that evolved during their interaction 
with the foreign negotiation partner are much more pivotal for explaining the EU-Canada talks. 
Carefully utilized by Quebec‟s Prime Minister Jean Charest and Peter Mandelson to bolster 
support for the talks, exporters were much more visible than sectoral interests who were 
concerned about the negotiations. Moreover, if business interests alone explained government 
initiatives, it is difficult to see why Canada became a priority for the EU in the 2000s only and 
why business support was not sufficient for the conclusion of an initial agreement between 2004 
and 2006. Only the political strategies on both the Canadian and the European side, the renewed 24 
 
interest of the Commission in bilateral trade negotiations and the delicate equilibrium between 
negotiators and the national government representatives can provide an accurate picture of 




Political economy approaches which assume that business interests are behind intergovernmental 
negotiations are insufficient to account for the evolution of the CETA negotiations. Business 
interests do matter and are often represented in the positions of member states, but the 
complexity of the multi-level system of trade policy making in the EU creates room for 
maneuver to cooperate with business representatives in a strategic manner. For the Commission, 
moving ahead on a partnership agreement with Canada was attractive because it allowed the EU 
to gain another foothold in the transatlantic market. It is the logical consequence of the EU‟s turn 
towards bilateral and regional trade agreements under the leadership of EU trade commissioner 
Peter Mandelson. Benefitting from the carefully crafted strategies of the Canadian provinces, the 
Commission was able to utilize the business support mobilized in Canada, because it relied on 
joint statements with European companies. In line with the delegation by design perspective, the 
Commission has thus a certain room for maneuver and it becomes crucial to study how it reacts 
to its foreign negotiation partners and cooperates with the member states.  
 
The political momentum created by the strategy developed under the leadership of Jean Charest 
also shows how important it is to work at both the member state level and the supranational level 
simultaneously. The added bonus for the Canadian provinces was that their federal government 25 
 
therefore felt that it needed to adopt similar operating procedures. Contrary to NAFTA, the 
provinces gained a seat at the negotiating table and Prime Minister Stephen Harper asked for an 
official mandate for the federal government on behalf of the provinces. An unintended 
consequence of the EU-Canada talks thus concerns the policy-making process, where Canada 
partially imported the European procedures. It will be interesting to see if this will create a two-
way lobbying dynamic in Canada as well, were protectionism is brought to the ears of the 




1 Articles 131-135 (ex 110-116) of the Treaty on European Union. Article 300 (ex 228) provides 
the supranational institutions with powers to conclude trade agreements with third countries.  
2 Mixed competence means that trade authority is delegated on an ad hoc basis to the 
Community. The setting of objectives and the ratification of the negotiation results are subject to 
a unanimous vote by the Council, whereas both require only a qualified majority under exclusive 
competence. 
3 The EU complaint concerned the Helms-Burton Act, a US law sanctioning European foreign 
investors in Cuba. 
4 Available from within the EU at http://mkaccdb.eu.int.  






9 See for example the editorial by the chairman of the Canada Europe Roundtable: Roy 
MacLaren, “EU, Canada put faith in trade,” The Toronto Star, 5 July 2010. 
10 See for example the website of the Council of Canadians, 
www.canadians.org/tradeblog/?p=619 or Blair Redlin, “Just what we don‟t need: An investor 
rights deal with the EU,” rabble.ca, 13 April 2009.  
11 http://tradejustice.ca 27 
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